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NORTH DAKOTA'S TEN-YEAR STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS, PART II
HENRY G. RUEMMELE0
N the first part of this discussion,1 two of the requirements of
the ten-year statute of limitations with respect to real pro-
perty "--i.c., that adverse possession be under color of title, and
that the possession be genuinely adverse-were commented upon.
The third requirement of the statute, that the claimant shall have
paid all the taxes upon the land for a period of ten years, remains
to be considered, as does the effect of the amendments to the
statute adopted in 1951.
3. PAYMENT OF TAXES
The ten-year statute of limitations provides that in addition to
holding adverse possession of the land involved for a period of
ten years under color of title, the claimant shall "have paid all
taxes and assessments legally levied thereon."
It was this provision which prompted the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals to state in Schauble v. Schulz 3 that the statute is,
in a "limited sense . . . a revenue measure," and further that "it is
difficult to perceive why, as between two persons holding ad-
verse titles to land, the failure of one to either pay taxes or assert
a right to the possession for several years may not justly be made
the ground of requiring a comparatively prompt assertion of title,
at the risk of its extinguishment in favor of the other claimant,
when, during the same years, he has paid the taxes and has been
in actual, open, adverse, and undisputed possession." 4
In Streeter Co. v. Fredrickson,- the problem of whether tacking
was permissible under the statute came before the court. The
court said that, "The statute . . . makes the payment of taxes by
the claimant an essential condition, and one which is prerequi-
site to the perfecting of title thereunder. It is necessary to the
claimant as his adverse possession; in other words, payment of
taxes and adverse possession must concur . . . . There is no doc-
*Ph.B., LL.B., Lecturer in Law, University of North Dakota School of Law. Mr.
Ruemmele is associated with the Grand Forks Abstracting Company.
1. Ruemmele, North Dakota's Ten-Year Statute of Limitations, Part 1, 28 N.Dak.L;Rev.
159 (1952),
2. N.D. Sess. L. 1951, c. 276, amending N.D. Rev. Code §47-0603 (1943).
3. 187 Fed. 389 (8th Cir. 1905).
4. Id. at 392.
5. 11 N.D. 300, 91 N.W. 692 (1902).
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trine of tacking payment of taxes which can be invoked. The feat-
ure requiring payment of taxes is modern, is found in but few
states, and is peculiar to special statutes fixing short periods of
limitation. Where the payment of taxes is thus made a condition
for acquiring title by adverse possession, the claimant is held to
a strict performance of the condition, and it is not enough that
the taxes have been paid during the statutory period. It must
be made to affirmatively appear that they were paid by the claim-
ant, or on his behalf." ' This case seems to have settled the ques-
tion of whether tacking was permissible under the statute, as
no cases have been found where the issue was raised again.
In Stiles v. Granger,- the court was called upon to decide
whether purchase of a tax sale certificate constituted payment of
taxes, where the purchase was made by an agent of the adverse
possessor in the name of the adverse possessor. The defendant
Granger had gone into adverse possession of the land involved
in 1890, under a deed from one Bowdle, who had in turn acquired
the land through invalid tax deed proceedings. Granger paid the tax-
es for six years and on the seventh year took a trip for his health,
instructing his agent to pay the taxes. Through oversight the agent
failed to do so, but purchased the land in Granger's name at the
resulting tax sale. The court held, when Granger's acquisition
of the title under the statute was challenged, that "the sale of
land to the person claiming ownership and in possession, whose
duty it is to pay the taxes, is void, and operates as a payment.
The purchaser under such circumstances acquires no title by
his purchase, and it is deemed to be only one method of paying
the taxes." s The decision is apparently contra to the weight of
authority on the subject,9 and it might be possible that in again
considering the question in a situation where the facts were not
so favorable to the adverse possessor, the court would decide other-
wise.
In what is apparently the only other reported case in North
Dakota on the subject of payment of taxes, the court, in Hille v.
Nill,1° inferred that the property claimed was "taxed as unplat-
ted acreage property." The case involved an easement of way in
favor of the public which it was claimed had been extingushed
by adverse possession under the ten-year statute. One of the
6. Id. at 305-06, 91 N.W. at 695.
7. 17 N.D. 502, 117 N.W. 777 (1908).
8. Id. at 507-08, 117 N.W. at 779.
9. See Note, 132 A.L.R. 216, 248 (1941); 2 C.J.S. 753.
10. 58 N.D. 536, 226 N.W. 635 (1929).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
questions involved was whether taxes had been assessed and
paid on the basis that the property was subject to the easement.
The inference that the property had been taxed as unplatted
acreage property was orrived at without proof in the record, and
seems to be in the face of the language already quoted from
Streeter Co. v. Fredrickson, supra, to the effect that with respect
to the payment of taxes the adverse claimant is obliged to make
it "affirmatively appear that they were paid by the claimant, or
on his behalf."',
There was no showing of an acceptance by the public of the
easement of way given to it in Hille v. Nill. If there had been
an acceptance, of course, the property would have been exempt
from taxation. The case therefore raises the interesting ques-
tion of whether property exempt from the payment of taxes can
be claimed under the statute in question. It has been said that,
"Where land is exempt from taxation some courts hold it is not
necessary to show payment, while others hold that title to such
property cannot be acquired under such a statute but must be ac-
quired under a statute which does not require payment of taxes." 12
And it has been further said that "under a statutory requirement of
'payment of taxes legally assessed,' the authorities are in conflict as
to whether the absence of an assessment, or an illegal assessment,
dispenses with the necessity for payment of taxes." 13
It has been generally held under statutes of this type that the
payment of taxes must concur for the number of consecutive or
successive years provided by the statute, and a failure to pay
any one or more years of the statutory period is fatal. There seems
to be a conflict as to whether payment of the taxes by the true owner
will interrupt the running of the statute in favor of the adverse
claimant."M
4. THE 1951 AMENDMENTS TO THE STATUTE
In 1951, the North Dakota Legislative Assembly amended and
re-enacted Section 47-0603 of the North Dakota Revised Code
of 1943 to read as follows:
"TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY; ADVERSE POSSESSION.
A title to real property, vested in any person or those under
whom he claims, who shall have been in the actual open ad-
11. 11 N.D. at 306, 91 N.W. at 695.
12. 2 C.J.S. 746.
13. 2 C.J.S. 746.
14. There is an excellent annotation on the entire subject of payment of taxes in 132
A.L.R. 216 (1941).
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verse and undisputed possession of the land under such title
for a period of ten years and who shall have paid all taxes and
assessments legally levied thereon, shall be valid in law. A con-
tract for deed shall constitute color of title within the mean-
ing of this section from and after the execution of such con-
tract." 15
The italicized portions of the section were added by the leg-
islature, and their purpose is fairly evident. The words "or those
under whom he claims" undoubtedly were intended to permit
tacking under the statute and thus do away with the decision
in Streeter Co. v. Fredrickson. However, it would nevertheless
appear that in order to tack adverse possessions under the
statute, there will have to be privity of estate as between the suc-
cessive adverse possessors. That this is so is manifest from a con-
sideration of the function of the doctrine of tacking as the North
Dakota court conceives of it.
Discussing the requirement of privity in Streeter Co. v. Fred-
rickson, the court said that the purpose of "this so-called 'doc-
trine of tacking' is . . . not to determine whether the occupant
has been in possession for any fixed period of time, but is to
determine whether the claimant out of possession has in fact
or in law been in possession within the satutory period, so as
to entitle him to maintain his action. In other words, it is mere-
ly a uniform rule adopted by the courts for determining whether
a claimant out of possession when his action is commenced has
been in possession at any time within the 20 year period. If no
privity is found to exist between the successive disseisors, and
the last occupant has not held adversely for the full statutory
period, the bar is not complete, as the law presumes that the pos-
Session of the land returns to the true owner at each change of
possession, when there is no privity between the several occu-
pants."16
In discussing the question of why tacking was permissible
under the twenty-year statute of limitations with respect to real
property, and not under the ten-year statute, the court pointed
out that in contrast to the twenty-year statute the ten-year stat-
ute "does not provide that no action shall be maintained to re-
cover real property or the possession thereof unless the plaintiff
shall have been in possession within ten years prior to the com-
mencement of the action. Neither does it make possession by the
plaintiff at any time a prerequisite to the maintenance of his
15. N.D. Sess. L. 1951, c. 276.
16. 11 N.D. at 304, 91 N.W. at 694-95.
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action . . . This statute, on the contrary, instead of presenting
any question as to the possession of the claimant out of posses-
sion, deals entirely with persons in possession, and extends the
benefits of its provisions to such persons by boldly declaring that
their title is good if they have been in actual, open, adverse, and
undisputed possession of the land for ten years, and have paid all
taxes and assessments legally levied thereon."'1
Having made this distinction between the two statutes, the
court continued that "the legislature saw fit, in the statute under
consideration, to extend its benefits only to persons who have
been in possession for ten years, and have paid the taxes during
such period. This being true, under the rule of statutory con-
struction, we are without authority to extend its operation by con-
struction to protect the titles of persons who do no come within
is provisions." "I The court added, in language already cited, that
even if this were not so, the payment of taxes could not be tacked.
It should probably be pointed out that North Dakota seems to
stand alone in its interpretation of the statute as not permitting
the tacking of payment of taxes 19 but apparently other courts have
more or less limited the doctrine to some extent and some of them
hold that the taxes must be paid by the person in whom the color
of title is vested, or by some one on his behalf, and that payment
by the predecessor or grantor after the conveyance is not accept-
able payment under the statute.
It is highly probable that the North Dakota court will follow
the provisions of the statute and permit tacking. However, in
the matter of the payment of taxes an interesting question arises
which the court will probably have to face in the near future: what
of the situation where the minerals have been severed from the
surface?
Under Section 57-0224 of the Revised Code of 1943, the asses-
sor is obliged to "list for taxation all coal and other minerals under-
lying any lands the ownership of which has been severed from the
ownership of the overyling strata, and shall assess such coal and
other minerals to the owner in the county in which the same actu-
ally lie."
Section 57-0225 requires the county auditor to give the asses-
sor an accurate description of any lands in which the title to the
coal or minerals is not in the person holding the title to the over-
17. Id. at 304-05, 91 N.W. at 695.
18. Id. at 305, 91 N.W. at 695.
19. See Note, 132 A.L.R. 216, 232 (1941).
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lying strata, with the name of the holder of the title to such land
and of the holder of the mineral rights.
Construing these two sections in Northwestern Improvement
Co. v. Oliver County,2 where a reservation or exception was made
of coal and iron, the court stated that "such reservations as these
should be assessed in the name of the plaintiff, if they have a tax-
able value." 21 The court pointed out that such reservations pos-
sess a taxable value by stating that "the interest retained must
necessarily detract from the volue of the land to the grantee,"
and further that "the value of these mineral rights can be ascer-
tained . . . Where no mines have been opened, and where no de-
posits of coal have been ascertained so as to be able to estimate
the amount of mineral present in the land, the difference of the
value of the land as sold with and without this reservation of title
in the grantor would measure the value of plaintiff's interest in the
land. Where the amount of mineral in the land has been ascer-
tained, then the value of that mineral, together with the value of
the rights to go upon the lands, would be a fair measure of the
plaintiff's interest." 2 In a concurring opinion, Justice Christ-
ianson stated, "I also agree that a reservation of mineral rights is
an interest in real property, assessable against the grantor mak-
ing the reservation ... ,, 23
The court, in State v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation,24 held
that oil and natural gas are generally classified as minerals. The
question thus becomes quite material whether or not a severance
of the minerals by a mineral deed, with the following requirement
that the minerals must be assessed separately, has not created a
severance in the tax so that payment by the surface owner would
not inure to the benefit of the mineral owner, and a subsequent
clearing of the title to the surface will not avail insofar as the min-
erals are concerned. This and many other questions remain un-
answered.
The other addition to the statute made by the 1951 legislature
was the provision that "A contract for deed shall constitute color
of title within the meaning of this section from and after the exe-
cution of such contract." From the previous discussion of the mat-
ter of whether a contract for deed gives the vendee color of
20. 38 N.D. 57, 164 N.W. 315 (1917).
21. Id. at 65, 164 N.W. at 318.
22. Id. at 65-66, 164 N.W. at 319.
23. Id. at 67, 164 N.W. at 319.
24. 49 N.W.2d 14 (N.D. 1951).
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title, '2 it would appear that in all probability the legislature was
trying to remove any doubts, but at the same time it might be
argued that the amendment indicates that prior to the enactment
of the change a contract for deed did not, in the contemplation
of the legislature, constitute color of title. However, the import-
ant question concerning the amendments is simply whether they
have a retrospective effect so as to in some instances shorten the
ten year period, or whether they will apply only prospectively
to transactions occurring after their enactment.
The same problem arose when the ten-year statute of limita-
tation was first enacted, and the manner in which it was solved
at that time casts a good deal of light on the problem. One of
the most interesting early cases was Schauble v. Schulz,26 where
the constitutionality of a retrospective application of the statute
came before the court. The facts of the case were that when the
ten-year statute of limitations was first enacted, the defendant had
already been in adverse possession of the tract of land involved
for nine years. He contended that the statute was retroactive
and that his title had therefore matured when he completed ten
years of adverse possession and payment of taxes a little over a
year and a half after the act was approved by the governor. The
plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that the act applied to
only those transactions occurring after it became effective, and
that if it were construed otherwise it took away his rights abi-
trarily, leaving him no reasonable time within which to assert
them, hence violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
The court said, in dealing with this contention, that "it is an
essential requisite of due process of law that full opportunity be
afforded for the assertion and enforcement of the right after it
comes within the present or prospective operation of such a stat-
ute and before the extinguishment takes effect. A statute which
does not afford this opportunity is abitrary and violates the con-
stitutional prohibition, but, if the opportunity be afforded, it is
no objection to the statute that it has some regard to the past acts
and omissions of the parties concerned, or to conditions produced
by past occurrences, and is therefore not wholly prospective." 2"
The court then concluded that the original act itself, by the use
25. See Ruemmele, North Dakota's Ten-Year Statute of Limitations, Part 1, 28
N.Dak.L.Rev. 171-75 (1952).
26. 137 Fed. 389 (8th Cir. 1905).
27. Id. at 392.
NORTH DAKOTA'S TEN-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
of the words "have been or hereafter may be" 28 showed an inten-
tion that it should have a retrospective effect, and decided on the
facts of the case that the plaintiff had a sufficient time within
which to protect himself, and that this was sufficient even though
the act itself did not provide such a time. In other words, the test
was whether the particular plaintiff had a reasonable time, and
not whether the act provided a reasonable time.
The Schauble case, while noting that the ten-year statute is
not strictly a statute of limitations, does apply rules of interpreta-
tion and constitutional limitations which are ordinarily applied
to such statutes, and it may be that from these some information
can be gleaned. The Schauble case, however, arose in the federal
courts, and the North Dakota decisions also shed light on the
subject.
The first North Dakota case to consider the statute, Power v.
Kitching, 29 was decided in 1901 and also involved the constitu-
tionality of the ten-year statute on several grounds: (1) that the
bill embraced more than one subject-a contention the case re-
jected-and (2) that the statute unreasonably abridged the plain-
tiff's right to bring his action to recover possession of the land
because of its retrospective operation. The defendant had ob-
tained a tax deed to the land on November 2, 1889. The tax
deed was concededly invalid, and the ten-year statute had not
been enacted, so that the plaintiff had a period of twenty years
within which to bring an action to recover possession of the pro-
perty. In 1899, a little less than ten years after the defendant went
into possession of the land, the legislature adopted the ten-year
statute of limitations. The bill was approved on March 8, 1899,
and took effect on July 1, 1899. Pointing to these facts, the court
said that, "There was therefore a period of over seven months after
the approval of the law by the governor, and a period of over four
months after the law took effect, within which an action might
might have been brought against the defendant to determine his
adverse claim of title. Said chapter, therefore, when applied to con-
ditions established in this case, did not operate to unreasonably
abridge the period within which an action might be brought to
determine defendant's claim of title. A purchaser at a tax sale
has no vested right in the statute of Imitations in force at the date of
sale. The statute may be changed and shortened by subsequent
28. It might be pointed out that these words have been omitted from the act as it
was revised by the Legislative Assembly in 1951.-
29. 10 N.D. 254, 86 N.W. 737 (1901).
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legislation, provided, always, that a reasonable time is allowed
within which actions may be brought." 30 It is to be noted in
this case that the court applied the test of reasonableness as to
the plaintiff and not to any provision in the act itself, so that
an action brought in 1900 was subject to the ten-year statute passed
in 1899. This in effect reduced the true owner's rights in the pro-
perty from a twenty-year period to a ten year period."l
The rule of Power v. Kitching has not survived unchallenged,
however. In 1920, in a concurring opinion in Stoll v. Gottbreht,32
Justice Robinson stated that the ten-year statute was void as not
meeting the requirement of having a title to express its purpose
and further that "it is a mere blind and it in no manner indicates
that the purpose of the act was to fix a limitation of ten years in
which an action may' be commenced to recover real property. The
act does not give the owner of real property a day, nor a minute, to
commence an action after it takes effect; and if it was void when
passed, it is still void as to an action commenced years after its
passage. If it was void as to an action commenced on the first day
of July after its passage, it is still void, because time does not make
it valid. The decision of the court in Power v. Kitching... is clear-
ly wrong and it should be expressly overruled." 33
Looking at the possible effect of the amendments, it may be
pointed out that if tacking is to be permitted and if the amend-
ments have a retrospective effect it will be possible under the
amendments for one who has been in adverse possession for only
one day under color of title to gain a clear fee simple if "those
under whom he claims"-and they might be several persons-
have been in adverse possession for ten years less one day and
have paid all taxes properly. Conversely, from the angle of the
true owner it might be possible for a title to be wiped out in a
much shorter time than he had supposed if the amendment is
to be considered retrospective in operation. Thus, if A went into
adverse possession of the land of B nine years before the passage
of the amendments, and sold to C five years before the adoption
of the amendment, B's title might be wiped out in one additional
year if the amendments are to be considered retrospective in
character, whereas under the prior statute five additional years
would be required before C's title would ripen. The same situa-
30. Id. at 258, 86 N.W. at 738.
31. The court followed Power v. Kitching in Woolfok v. Albrecht, 22 N.D. 36, 133
N.W. 310 (1911).
32. 45 N.D. 158, 176 N.W. 932 (1920).
33. Id. at 165, 176 N.W. at 934.
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tion might arise if contracts for deed were not color ,of title before
the amendment and are after the amendment. Of course, it. might
be said that under the rule of Power v. Kitching and Schauble
v. Schulz a reasonable time must be afforded the true owner for
protecting his interests, and the test of reasonableness must be
applied to the facts in each case in question.
But this latter statement is not as cut and dried as it would
appear. The general rule, and the rule in North Dakota, seems
to be that when a statute of limitations is shortened or a vested
right is taken away, that the act so shortening or taking away
the vested right must itself make provision for a reasonable time,
and the court is not at liberty to supply the omission under the
facts of any given case. A rather cursory examination of the author-
ities will disclose a rather interesting situation in this regard.
Apparently in the period between 1890 and 1900 the legislature
was busy reducing the periods provided for in the various statutes
of limitatipns, and out of this grew a good deal of judicial inter-
pretation and enunciation of what the rules were to be in North
Dakota. In 1898, in Merchants National Bank v. Braithwaite,
34
the court had an opportunity to discuss the effect of such reduc-
tions in the case of a statute reducing the lien of judgments from
twenty to ten years. It appeared in that case that the act was
signed by the governor on March 2, 1895, and became effective
on January 1, 1896, but the act itself provided for no reasonable
time for judgment holders to protect themselves from the reduc-
tion. The court stated the rule to be that "the time in which to
commence an action may be lessened as to existing causes of
action, provided the suitor has still a reasonable time after -the
new law is passed in which to commence his suit." 15 The court
then added that the "reasonable time is to be computed from the
day when the new law is passed, and not from the time when it
takes effect." 36
In meeting the objection that the law itself provided for no rea-
sonable time, the court stated that "we do not think that this pro-
vision is essential to the validity of such statutory change, when
applied to existing causes of action, provided the time actually
left in which to sue is not unreasonable." :17 It stated the rule to be
that "if in the particular case the time is not reasonable, the court
must either declare that the statute does not embrace such a case,
34. 7 N.D. 358, 75 N.W. 244 (1898).
35. Id. at 371-72, 75 N.W. at 248.
36. Id. at 372, 75 N.W. at 248.
37. Id. at 373, 75 N.W. at 248.
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or that with respect thereto it is unconstitutional because it im-
pairs the obligation of a contract," 38
The court thus had adopted the following rules:
(1) That in computing reasonable time, the computation was
to begin with the time the act was passed and not when it went
into effect.
(2) That the act itself need not provide for a reasonable time
within which to sue, but reasonableness was to be governed by
the time afforded in each case, or in other words by whether the
suitor had brought his action in a timely manner.
The same statute was before the court in Osborne v. Lind-
strom,3" and in its decision the court began to withdraw from the
position it had taken in the Braithwaite case. In discussing -the
first rule, concerning the date from which the reasonable time was
to be computed, the court was cited to the New York case of Gilbert
v. Ackerman,40 which held that the time for computing reasonable-
ness was from the time the act took effect and not from the date
of its passage. The court was still willing, however, to follow the
precedent of the Braithwaite case, in that regard.
However, in speaking of the second rule, the court stated, "We
shall hold in this case that the legislature need not fix an exact
time, provided the time they do fix must, in any event, be a rea-
sonable time; but so far as the language which is used in the
Braithwaite case imports that the legislature need not fix any time,
we think it misstates the law, and we do not wish to remain com-
mitted to it." 41
The court added that "it is stated in the syllabi of that -case-
although the opinion does not fully bear it out-that in the ab-
sence of a legislative provision fixing a time within which actions
may be brought on existing causes of action 'the court will deter-
mine in each case whether, after the new law took effect, the
suitor still had reasonable time under such new law, in which to
commence his action.' That language was wholly unnecessary in
the case, and does not meet our approval. When the legislature,
in fixing such time, makes it so short that the right to sue is prac-
tically denied, courts will declare such time unreasonable, and re-
fuse to enforce the law. But courts cannot go further, and fix a
time different from that fixed by the legislature within which
suits may be brought, and if the legislature has failed to fix any
38. Id. at 373, 75 N.W. at 248.
39. 9 N.D. 1, 81 N.W. 72 (1899).
40. 159 N.Y. 118, 53 N.E. 753 (1899).
41. 9 N.D. at 9, 81 N.W. at 75.
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time, the courts cannot, in a given case, supply this legislative
lapse. The fixing of the time within which to bring suit, under
such circumstances, is purely a legislative function. It is not with-
in the power of the judiciary. We take this earliest opportunity
to correct the errors that inadvertently found their way into the
Braithwaite case." 42
In applying the rules it thus laid down for itself in the Lindstrom
case, the court encountered some difficulty in finding a legislative
fixing of a reasonable time, and stated that "we are somewhat em-
barrassed by reason of the unusual circumstances attending the
passage of the act here involved.43
This left the rules as follows:
(1) The rule of the Braithwaite case, that in computing a rea-
sonable time for bringing suit, the time was to be computed from
the date the act was passed and not the date it went into effect,
was retained.
(2) The rule of the Braithwaite case, that the act itself need
not provide for a reasonable time within which to bring suit, was
rejected and the court held that the legislature had to fix a rea-
sonable time within which to bring suit, this being outside the
power of the judiciary.
In 1905, in Schauble v. Schulz, the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals stated on the authority of the Braithwaite and Osborne cases
that "it is settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court of North
Dakota that the statute was effective as notice of its prospective
operation from the date of its approval." 44 And as to the second
question it followed the Braithwaite case in adopting a rule of rea-
sonableness under the facts of the case, rather than as contained
in the act itself.
However, in the same year, the North Dakota court in Clark
v. Beck and Ahman 45 had before it an emergency measure which
took effect upon its approval by the governor on February 27,
1901, providing for a limitation upon the right to foreclose a
mortgage by advertisement. In citing the Osborne case the court
said that "while the legislature has full power to enact limitation
laws, and even to frame them in such a way that the time already
elapsed before the law takes effect shall be computed as part of
the time limited by the new act, yet its power in this respect is
subject to the condition that it must allow a reasonable time after
42. Id. at 9-10, 81 N.W. at 75.
43. Id. at 10, 81 N.W. at 75.
44. 137 Fed. at 393.
45. 14 N.D. 287, 103 N.W. 755 (1905).
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the new law becomes operative in which persons affected by it
may resort to the remedies to which the law applies . . . The law
in question makes no provision in this respect and the courts have
no power to supply the omission." 46 The foreclosure in the case
was had on November 23, 1901, and consistent with the Braithwaite
case and the Schauble case the court would have looked at the
time from February 27 to November 23 to determine whether a
reasonable time had elapsed. But the court refused to do this, and
in order to sustain the statute held that it had prospective effect
only, stating that "the time elapsed before the passage and approval
of the act cannot be taken as any part of the time limited by
the amendment for commencing proceedings to foreclose by
advertisement. The act does not expressly so declare and if it did
it would be unconstitutional as to those whose right to invoke the
remedy had accrued ten years or more before the act took effect." 47
It will be noted that the Court stated the legislature must allow
a reasonable time "after the new law becomes operative."
In 1908, in Adams & Freese v. Kenoyer,48 the court had be-
fore it an amendment passed on March 10, 1905, -which went into
effect on July 1, 1905, providing that absence from the state did
not toll the statute of limitations as to the right to bring action
to foreclose a mortgage. Speaking of the Osborne case, -the court
stated that "it was there held, after disapproving a contrary rule
announced in the earlier case of Bank v. Braithwaite . . . that in
order that the amendatory statute may apply to existing causes
of action the legislature must fix a reasonable time in which
actions may be brought thereon after such new statute is passed,49
and the court continued that "in so far as the Osborne case holds
that the legislature and not the courts must fix the reasonable time
in which suits upon existing causes of action may be brought in
order to make the amendatory statute applicable as to such causes
of action, it undoubtedly is sound, and the contrary doctrine laid
down in Bank v. Braithwaite . . . was correctly repudiated." 50
In discussing the question of whether or not the time between
passage of the amendment and the effective date of the amend-
ment was to be considered part of the time limited for bringing
suit, the court said that in the Osborne case it was "squarely held
that the time between the passage of such amendatory statute and
46. Id. at 288, 103 N.W. at 755.
47. Id. at 288, 103 N.W. at 755.
48. 17 N.D. 302, 116 N.W. 98 (1908).
49. Id. at 305, 116 N.W. at 99.
50. Id. at 305-06, 116 N.W. at 99.
NORTH DAKOTA S TEN-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 311
the time of its taking effect will be considered in determining
whether a reasonable time is given for the bringing of suits on
such existing causes of action, and they expressly refer to and re-
pudiate the doctrine announced by the Court of Appeals of New
York to the contrary." 51 The opinion then continued: "The writer
of this opinion is firmly convinced both of the palpable fallacy
and injustice of the rule thus announced in the Osborne case and
of the eminently correct and just doctrine enunciated by the New
York court. The practical effect of holding that the creditor must
take notice of the amendment and bring his suit before the statute
takes effect as a law is to deprive him of his property rights alto-
gether; for it is a matter of general knowledge of which we must
take judicial notice that during the greater portion of the time,
if not the entire time, between the passage of a law in this state
and July first thereafter, at which date the law takes effect, in the
absence of an emergency clause or the designation of another date,
there is no method by which the citizen can acquaint himself with
the official contents of such statute except by an examination of
the original in the office of the secretary of state, as there is no law
requiring publication of new statutes except in bound volumes,
which usually takes until after July first following their enactment
... Regardless of what courts may have held on this point in other
states, the writer firmly believes that no such harsh rules should
be longer sanctioned in this jurisdiction." 12 This was, however,
dictum as the court added that "we are not required . . . to
either affirm or reverse the Osborne case on this point, as we do
not consider said point at all decisive of this appeal, or necessarily
involved, and therefore the majority of the members of the court
express no opinion thereon either way." 53
The court then held that the statute could not be applied to
existing actions for two reasons: (1) in the enactment of the
statute the legislature had fixed no time for the bringing of suits
on such causes of action, and (2) conceding that it intended to
and did fix such time, the time thus fixed was unreasonable as
a matter of law.
The court was then confronted with the reasoning of the Braith-
waite case that the action involved was not brought until eight
months after the act was passed, and six months and thirteen days
after it took effect, and that this was a reasonable time. The court
51. Id. at 307, 116 N.W. at 99.
52. Id. at 307, 116 N.W. at 99-100.
53. Id. at 307, 116 N.W. at 100.
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stated "the act must be applied generally to all claims and to all
estates. A single claim or a single estate cannot be pointed out
in which the act applied and then say it does not apply to any
other claim or to any other estate. But conceding that the legis-
lature in enacting the statute intended to make it retroactive as
well as prospective in its operation, and also intended to and did
fix the time between its enactment and the date of its taking ef-
fect . . . for the institution of proceedings on existing mortgages,
still the time thus fixed was as a matter of law unreasonable, and
hence the statute cannot be held to apply to foreclosure proceed-
ings under mortgages which had matured prior to the enactment
thereof." 54
This leaves the rules the court has adopted concerning retroac-
tive amendments to statutes of limitations as follows:
(1) It is essential to the validity of such amendments that the
legislature must fix a reasonable time within which to bring suit
upon existing causes of action in order to allow such amendment
to be retrospectively applied to them, and if it fails to do so the
court cannot supply the omission.
-(2) That in computing what is a reasonable time, the court will
not. take into consideration the time between the date the act is
approved and the date it becomes effective, since the court has
held that the time between passage and effect is unreasonable as
a matter of law, even conceding that the legislature intended it
to be a reasonable time.
It is said in Corpus Juris Secundum 55 that "in determining what
constitutes a reasonable time, the period which elapses between
the enactment of the statute and its taking effect is also to be taken
into consideration," and the Iowa cases of Collier v. Smaltz,56 and
Wooster v. Bateman, 7 are cited in support of the statement.
Both of these cases involved statutes which provided for a year
after the act took effect in which to bring action, and the Iowa
court, in construing the time granted as being reasonable, merely
added the time between passage and effect to the year to arrive
at the conclusion that the time was reasonable.
The Osborne case is also cited in Corpus Juris Secundum 58 for
the proposition that the time between passage and taking effect
is to be taken into consideration as to reasonableness, but in Ruling
54. Id. at 308-09, 116 N.W. at 100.
55. 16 C.J.S. 1238.
56. 149 Iowa 230, 128 N.W. 896 (1910).
57. 126 Iowa 552, 102 N.W. 521 (1905).
58. 58 C.J.S. 918.
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Case Law 19 the matter is presented as being in conflict, the
Osborne and Braithwaite cases being cited for the taking of the
time between passage and effect into account, and the New York
case of Gilbert v. Ackerman, supra, for the contrary position.
There is no doubt that the rule enunciated by the 'Braithwaite
case that the act itself need not provide for a reasonable time has
been directly overruled by subsequent cases. The other rule that
the time between passage and effect shall be considered in arriving
at whether a reasonable time has been provided for by the legis-
lature has been weakened by the dictum appearing in the Adams
& Freese decision, where the New York rule is spoken of as being
"eminently correct and just." And in addition the court, in the
Adams & Freese case and in Clark v. Beck and Ahman, supra,
held that as a matter of law the time between taking effect and
passage was unreasonable.
In the light of these precedents, the question which raises itself
is whether or not a retrospective application of the 1951 amend-
ments to the ten year statute would, in the language of the Schauble
case, "extinguish rights arbitrarily" so as to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.
There is no doubt that a retroactive application of the amend-
ment intended to permit tacking will act to extinguish rights in
a shorter period of time. The same would hold true if a contract
for deed is to be considered as not having given the vendee in
the contract color of title within the meaning of that phrase prior
to the amendment. It would therefore appear that for the amended
statute to be retroactively valid the legislature should have pro-
vided for a reasonable time for the protection of those "rights"
as affected by the amendment, and the question arises whether
the time between passage and taking effect, in this instance from
March 7, 1951, to July 1, 1951, should be considered as a legis-
lative intended time. The writer is inclined to believe that even
if the legislature had intended that the period should be so con-
sidered the court would hold it unreasonable as a matter of law.
In the case of a contract for deed giving color of the title
the court could very possibly dodge the issue by stating that a
contract for deed always did give the vendee color of title under
the statute, and that the amendment merely placed in statutory
59. 17 R.C.L. 677.
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form what already was the law. 60 It would be the writer's con-
clusion that the amendments do not have retroactive effect and
would probably be held inapplicable to rights of the true owners
which had not been divested prior to the effective date of the
amendments.
60. This would be a highly probable result, since the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
held in Schauble v. Schultz, supra, that contracts for deed were to be considered as
giving color of title under North Dakota law. While the decision of a federal court
on a matter of this kind is not binding precedent, it is certainly persuasive authority of
the highest order.
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